

## CLAUDIUS PTOLEMY

ALMAGEST<sup>1</sup>

## Book I

Syrus ?  
1. {Preface}

The true philosophers, Syrus, were, I think, quite right to distinguish the theoretical part of philosophy, from the practical. For even if practical philosophy, before it is practical, turns out to be theoretical, nevertheless one can see that there is a great difference between the two: in the first place, it is possible for many people to possess some of the moral virtues even without being taught, whereas it is impossible to achieve theoretical understanding of the universe without instruction; furthermore, one derives most benefit in the first case [practical philosophy] from continuous practice in actual affairs, but in the other [theoretical philosophy] from making progress in the theory. Hence we thought it fitting to guide our actions (under the impulse of our actual ideas [of what is to be done]) in such a way as never to forget, even in ordinary affairs, to strive for a noble and disciplined disposition, but to devote most of our time to intellectual matters, in order to teach theories, which are so many and so beautiful, and especially those to which the epithet 'mathematical' is particularly applied. For Aristotle divides theoretical philosophy too, very fittingly, into three primary categories, physics, mathematics and theology. For everything that exists is composed of matter, form and motion; none of these [three] can be observed in its substratum by itself, without the others: they can only be imagined. Now the first cause of the first motion of the universe, if one considers it simply, can be thought of as an invisible and motionless deity; the division [of theoretical philosophy] concerned with investigating this [can be called] 'theology', since this kind of activity, somewhere up in the

<sup>1</sup>This reading consists of Chapters 1-8 of Book One of Ptolemy's *Almagest*. It is reprinted with the generous permission of Gerald Duckworth & Co., Ltd. from *Ptolemy's Almagest*, trans. and annotated by G. J. Toomer (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1984).

highest reaches of the universe, can only be imagined, and is completely separated from perceptible reality. The division [of theoretical philosophy] which investigates material and ever-moving nature, and which concerns itself with 'white', 'hot', 'sweet', 'soft' and suchlike qualities one may call 'physics'; such an order of being is situated (for the most part) amongst corruptible bodies and below the lunar sphere. That division [of theoretical philosophy] which determines the nature involved in forms and motion from place to place, and which serves to investigate shape, number, size, and place, time and suchlike, one may define as 'mathematics'. Its subject-matter falls as it were in the middle between the other two, since, firstly, it can be conceived of both with and without the aid of the senses, and, secondly, it is an attribute of all existing things without exception, both mortal and immortal: for those things which are perpetually changing in their inseparable form, it changes with them, while for eternal things which have an aethereal nature, it keeps their unchanging form unchanged.

From all this we concluded: that the first two divisions of theoretical philosophy should rather be called guesswork than knowledge, theology because of its completely invisible and ungraspable nature, physics because of the unstable and unclear nature of matter; hence there is no hope that philosophers will ever be agreed about them; and that only mathematics can provide sure and unshakeable knowledge to its devotees, provided one approaches it rigorously. For its kind of proof proceeds by indisputable methods, namely arithmetic and geometry. Hence we were drawn to the investigation of that part of theoretical philosophy, as far as we were able to the whole of it, but especially to the theory concerning divine and heavenly things. For that alone is devoted to the investigation of the eternally unchanging. For that reason it too can be eternal and unchanging (which is a proper attribute of knowledge) in its own domain, which is neither unclear nor disorderly. Furthermore it can work in the domains of the other [two divisions of theoretical philosophy] no less than they do. For this is the best science to help theology along its way, since it is the only one which can make a good guess at [the nature of]